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Abstract.
Purpose - The selection of security configurations for complex infor-
mation systems is a cumbersome process. Decision-making regarding the
choice of security countermeasures has to take into consideration a mul-
titude of, often conflicting, functional and non-functional system goals.
Therefore, a structured method to support crucial security decisions dur-
ing a system’s design that can take account of risk whilst providing feed-
back on the optimal decisions within specific scenarios would be valuable.
Approach - Secure Tropos is a well established security requirements
engineering methodology, but it has no concepts of Risk, whilst Con-
strained Goal Models are an existing method to support relevant auto-
mated reasoning tasks. Hence we bridge these methods, by (i) extending
Secure Tropos to incorporate the concept of Risk, so that the elicita-
tion and analysis of security requirements can be complimented by a
systematic risk assessment process during a system’s design time; (ii)
supporting the reasoning regarding the selection of optimal security con-
figurations with respect to multiple system objectives and constraints,
via Constrained Goal Models.
Findings - As a means of conceptual evaluation, to give an idea of
the applicability of the approach and to check if alterations may be
desirable, a case study of its application to an e-government information
system is presented. The proposed approach is able to generate security
mechanism configurations for multiple optimisation scenarios that are
provided, whilst there are limitations in terms of a natural trade-off of
information levels of risk assessment that are required to be elicited.
Originality - The proposed approach adds additional value via its flex-
ibility in permitting the consideration of different optimisation scenarios
by prioritising different system goals and the automated reasoning sup-
port.
Keywords: Information Security, Security Requirements, Decision Mak-
ing, Constraint Goal Models, Secure Tropos
1 Introduction
The advances of technology have dramatically increased user expectations of
modern information systems. The continuous growth of the number of goals
that these systems are expected to satisfy, as well as the complexity of their
architectures, render software configuration (or reconfiguration) a challenging
process. In particular, information systems which are exposed to cyber-threats
must be able to respond to continuous changes in their environment that could
put their valuable assets at risk.
The selection of appropriate security configurations should take into consid-
eration the threat landscape in which the system will operate. Therefore, the
effects of vulnerabilities and threats towards a system’s goals, and their miti-
gation by security countermeasures, should play an important role during the
system’s design process (Viduto et al., 2012). The ever-changing nature of the
threat landscape is amplified by new paradigms in information system archi-
tecture (e.g., cloud computing, Internet of Things) (Islam et al., 2017). In such
volatile environments the risk posed by a threat can vary greatly, depending
on the impacted system component or the likelihood of a vulnerability being
exploited. Therefore, a flexible approach towards risk-aware decision-making is
crucial during system design, especially with regards to the system’s security
countermeasure configuration. An attempt to provide risk-aware decision sup-
port should also be able to take into account trade-offs between security and
other functional and non-functional system goals. Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly,
striking a balance between effective risk management and functional system de-
sign is a challenging endeavour.
To make progress in addressesing these challenges, in this paper we present
an extension of Secure Tropos and propose a methodology to support risk-aware
decision-making for the design of secure system configurations. Secure Tropos
(Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) is a security-oriented extension of the Tropos
methodology (Bresciani et al., 2004), which makes use of goal models to support
the elicitation and analysis of security requirements from the early stages of the
system development life-cycle. Other than its support for security modelling in an
explicit and structured manner, Secure Tropos has been selected as the basis of
our approach due to: (i) its social concepts (e.g., actors, goals, dependencies) and
analysis capabilities during the early requirements stage; (ii) the simultaneous
consideration of security along with the other requirements of the system-to-be;
and (iii) its ability to support the design stage of system development, through
the mapping of abstract security constraints and threats to specific security
mechanisms (Argyropoulos et al., 2015).
In terms of novelty, firstly risk related concepts and attributes are integrated
into Secure Tropos, thereby allowing designers to express the level of security
of their systems as cost-functions. Next, we propose the use of the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1988) to estimate the likelihood of threats to be
manifested. Our approach provides a new framework that selects optimal security
configurations with respect to the severity of threats and the priorities of other
goals. More specifically, we express the level of mitigation of each threat and
other goals of the systems (e.g. cost and performance) as cost-functions that our
proposed framework optimises according to a prioritised order of cost function;
that is, the best adaptations are selected according to the most important (most
highly prioritised) cost function and the best among those are selected according
to the second-most important cost function, etc. This paper builds on the work
of (Argyropoulos, Angelopoulos, Mouratidis and Fish, 2017) by improving the
formalisation and description of the risk calculation formulas, enhancing the
discussion of the proposed approach (e.g. of AHP, semi-automation), as well as
applying it to scenarios that express “real-life needs” of system stakeholders.
In terms of paper organisation, in Section 2 we first introduce central concepts
of all of the relevant research areas. Then, in Section 3 we describe: (i) how the
Secure Tropos meta-model is extended in order to support the notion of risk; (ii)
the instantiation of the basic risk assessment variables. In Section 4 we illustrate
our approach through a case study, providing a means of conceptual evaluation
aimed at eliciting possible limitations of future requirements for alterations of the
methodology, whilst providing some belief in the method’s practical applicability.
To aid the flow of the paper, we leave the discussion of related works until
Section 5. Lastly, in Section 6, we present discussions, conclusions and directions
of future work.
2 Research Baseline
In this section, we provide a research baseline for the Secure Tropos approach,
constrained goal models, and risk management, which are the main building
blocks of our proposed approach.
2.1 Goal Models
Secure Tropos, and therefore our approach, adopts the principles of Goal Ori-
ented Requirements Engineering (GORE). The centrepiece of GORE is the con-
cept of goal (Dardenne et al., 1993) that captures the intentions of stakeholders.
The initial goals are generally gradually refined into more detailed goals by mak-
ing use of the facility to express AND/OR boolean relationships. The refinement
process ends when each goal is refined into detailed tasks that can be assigned
to a human or software component. These tasks are called plans in the Secure
Tropos terminology. Since goals and plans can only express functional require-
ments of the system, the concept of softgoal (Chung et al., 2000) is additionally
used in order to express non-functional requirements. In Giorgini et al. (2003),
the fulfilment of a goal (or its lack of fulfilment) is characterised by the use of
the four propositions: full satisfaction (FS), partial satisfaction (PS), full denial
(FD) and partial denial (PD). In this work, in order to simplify the setup and
to focus on the core ideas, we do not consider partial propositions; they could
be an potential extension after the benefits of the new method is established.
2.2 Security Requirements Engineering
Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) is a goal-oriented security re-
quirements engineering approach and, as such, it is able to support the elicita-
tion and analysis of security requirements from the early stages of the system
development life-cycle. It utilises standard goal-oriented requirements engineer-
ing concepts (e.g., actors, goals, dependencies) but it also introduces concepts
from the domain of security engineering (e.g., security constraints, threats, se-
curity mechanisms). Secure Tropos facilitates system design and (security) re-
quirements elicitation through a number of interrelated modelling views. The
Security Requirements view is used to present the goal decomposition of each
system actor and the dependencies between them. Additionally, security con-
straints and threats are identified and connected to goals and resources within
the same modelling view; potential security mechanisms that can satisfy the
identified constraints and threats are also identified. The Security Attacks view
consists of an additional diagram for each threat that is identified within the
Security Requirements view; this decomposes each threat in order to identify its
attack methods, the system vulnerabilities that they exploit, as well as the cover-
age provided by the proposed security mechanisms against such vulnerabilities.
The use of online threat repositories (e.g., CAPEC (MITRE, 2017)) and the con-
sultation of security experts are recommended for the identification of threats,
attack methods and vulnerabilities and the derivation of sets of potential security
mechanisms. A detailed presentation of the components and modelling views of
the Secure Tropos methodology can be found in Mouratidis et al. (2016).
2.3 Constrained Goal Models
Goal models often present high variability, expressed by multiple alternative
solutions to fulfil one or more goals. One of the tasks of GORE is to decide
which of these alternatives should be implemented, and which should not be,
in the system-to-be. Given the nature of goal models, each goal represents a
predicate that can be related to other predicates via AND/OR relationships.
Therefore such relationships between goals can naturally be used to construct
first order logic formulas.
In order to elaborate on complex aspects of system designs, captured by goal
models, additional attributes can be assigned to different components of the
models. In this work we introduce a number of attributes to try to quantitatively
capture certain aspects of risk, security coverage and non-functional goals. Thus,
each alternative solution, in terms of choices of security mechanisms, leads to
a goal model with different values for each of the variables captured by the
newly-introduced attributes. Hence, goal reasoning in our approach corresponds
to finding a solution to a maximum satisfiability (MAX-SAT) problem.
To solve such problems we must turn our attention to the field of satisfia-
bility and optimisation modulo theories (SMT/OMT). There, the combination
of the different variables are captured by formulas associated with linear equa-
tions that must be optimised by any solution found for the satisfiability prob-
lem. The integration of SMT/OMT with goal models has been implemented by
Constrained Goal Models (CGMs) (Nguyen et al., 2016). Such goal models per-
mit the definition of: a) multiple variables associated with the modelled goals;
and b) linear equations composed of these variables that should be optimised.
Therefore, alongside the satisfiability problem, which is native to goal models,
a multi-objective optimisation problem should be solved in parallel. This is per-
formed via the use of a scalable external reasoner, OptiMathSAT (Sebastiani
and Trentin, 2015), which is invoked to find optimal solutions over CGMs.
The use of such a reasoner enables flexibility in the optimisation process so
that system designers and stakeholders can decide: (i) which variables capture
critical aspects of the system and should, therefore, be included in the formulas;
and (ii) the priority of each of the selected variables in the optimisation process.
As a result, the application of the reasoner can produce a number of system
configurations depending on the selected variables and their prioritisation. This
enables the construction of a number of scenarios during the decision support
step of the approach, each of which produces a different system configuration in
terms of the selected security mechanisms. Each of the resulting configurations
can then be used to produce a different business process instance by following
the rest of the framework’s steps.
2.4 Risk Management
In the field of information security, a risk expresses the potential of a threat
to exploit vulnerabilities of organisational assets and as a result harm the or-
ganisation (ISO/IEC, 2008). Risk management is a set of coordinated activities
performed by an organisation to minimise the effects of risks (ISO/IEC, 2014).
Risk assessment is the initial phase of the risk management process, during
which organisations elicit potential threats and the vulnerabilities they exploit to
threaten the functionality of their systems. The risk introduced by such vulner-
abilities is evaluated and security countermeasures for reducing or eliminating
the identified risk are recommended (Stoneburner et al., 2002). Values for the
impact and the likelihood of each identified vulnerability can be estimated using
either quantitative or qualitative metrics (Blakley et al., 2001). The consensus
approach for assigning a value to the risk introduced by each vulnerability is
by calculating the product of its impact and likelihood (Open Web Application
Security Project, 2015; Stoneburner et al., 2002). The overall risk introduced by
a threat can then be calculated as the sum of the individual risk values of each
of its associated vulnerabilities.
Risk reduction, via the use of countermeasures, is amongst the most estab-
lished strategies for risk mitigation. Countermeasures need to be prioritised in
terms of the coverage that they provide against each risk, but also in terms of
their contribution towards other non-functional objectives of the system (e.g.,
financial cost, technical constraints, usability) (ISO/IEC, 2008). The risk remain-
ing after the application of a risk mitigating strategy is known as the residual
risk. The final phase of the risk management process involves the continuous
evaluation and assessment of the implemented system throughout its life-cycle,
in order to account for potential changes to its composition and its execution
environment.
3 Capturing Risk with Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos introduces a conceptual basis which facilitates security trade-off
modelling and analysis (Elahi and Yu, 2007). However, an inherent limitation
of all Tropos-based approaches is their lack of precise semantics for the quan-
titative evaluation of system behaviours, including security and risk coverage
(Cailliau and Van Lamsweerde, 2012). Additionally, concepts necessary for the
risk analysis process (e.g., risk) are missing. Whilst attempts to align Tropos
with risk-related concepts have been developed (Matulevicˇius et al., 2008), they
lack the ability to quantitatively perform risk assessment and support a fine-
grained security trade-off analysis. To that end, we extend Secure Tropos with a
number of concepts and attributes, as presented in Fig. 1 in a bold, italic font.
3.1 Conceptual Model for Risk
The concept of Risk is introduced into the existing Secure Tropos metamodel and
connected to the concept of Threat, since any threat introduces a certain amount
of risk through its associated Vulnerabilities. Each vulnerability represents a
potential weakness that can be exploited by a threat and can thereby compromise
the system’s security.
The impact of each vulnerability is captured by the attribute Impact, which
can be evaluated using a number of different techniques. A common approach
used for estimating the impact of vulnerabilities is by using CVSS (Common
Vulnerabilities Scoring System) (Mell et al., 2007) and/or historical data. A
semi-quantitative scale is often used for the value assignment of a vulnerabil-
ities’ impact using discrete values (e.g., 10, 50, 100 to represent low, medium,
or high impact) (Viduto et al., 2012). However, in this work we choose to es-
timate the impact of a particular vulnerability as being the relative impact of
the vulnerability with respect to the impact of all of the other vulnerabilities
of the system. This means that the higher the value of the impact the more
important a vulnerability is deemed to be. Therefore, this allows us to estimate
the impact of each vulnerability by applying the Analytic Hierarchy process
(AHP) (Saaty, 1980, 1988), a prioritisation approach commonly used in soft-
ware engineering (Karlsson and Ryan, 1997; Vaidya and Kumar, 2006).
The probability of a vulnerability being exploited for the manifestation of
a security attack is captured by the Likelihood attribute. Similar to the esti-
mation of a vulnerability’s impact, the likelihood’s value quantifies how much
more probable is the exploitation of a vulnerability by a certain threat com-
pared to another one. Therefore, likelihood represents a different prioritisation
of vulnerabilities according to their probability of being exploited; it also can
be estimated using AHP. In contrast to its impact value, which is unique for
Fig. 1. A partial view of the Secure Tropos metamodel to demonstrate the exten-
sions proposed, including: (i) the addition of new concepts of Risk and Likelihood,
with their attributes ResidualRisk, InherentRisk, ResidualRiskThreshold, and Value,
respectively; (ii) the extension of existing concepts via the addition of new attributes
of Coverage to SoftGoal, Impact to Vulnerability, and SoftGoalContribution and Vul-
nerabilityMitigation to Security Mechanism.
each vulnerability, the likelihood value depends on the combination of a threat-
vulnerability pairing, because the same vulnerability can be exploited by more
than one threat but with a different likelihood.
The selection of AHP for the assignment of impact and likelihood values
allows the ranking of the identified vulnerabilities relative to each other. AHP
provides an applicable and intuitive structure to support decision making, mak-
ing it a popular choice among practitioners(Ishizaka and Labib, 2009). Compared
to other approaches, AHP confines the task of value assignment by performing
pairwise comparisons between the identified vulnerabilities, instead of defining
an arbitrary range of values against which each vulnerability is individually
evaluated. However, it also requires a larger overhead in terms of effort and time
especially if a large number of vulnerabilities are to be compared. Thus, the
trade-off between the required effort and the precision provided by the applica-
tion of AHP is an aspect that needs to be considered. Nonetheless, the rest of
the introduced steps for the risk assessment process are not dependent on the
usage of AHP, as the impact and likelihood values could instead be assigned
using any other value assignment technique.
The initial amount of risk introduced by a threat is an aggregation of the risk
introduced by each of the vulnerabilities exploited by the threat and is captured
by the InherentRisk attribute of the Risk concept. The amount of risk remain-
ing after risk treatment is applied by the introduction of security mechanisms,
is captured by the ResidualRisk attribute. Additionally, the attribute Residual-
RiskThreshold captures, for each threat, the maximum amount of residual risk
that would be accepted by the system stakeholders.
The concept of the Security Mechanism, which Secure Tropos uses to model
technologies utilised to implement the system’s security objectives, is extended
with a number of attributes. These attributes enable the evaluation of the con-
tribution of each security mechanism towards the achievement of each of the
system’s soft-goals (SoftGoalContribution) and the mitigation of each identified
vulnerability (VulnerabilityMitigation).
Finally the Coverage attribute has been added to the Soft Goal concept in
order to capture the total coverage provided to each of the system’s soft goals
by the selected sets of security mechanisms.
3.2 Risk Assessment
Following the development of the extended Secure Tropos meta-model, as
previously presented in Fig. 1, we can define functions which will be used to
guide the risk-based adaptation process.
Definition 1. Let V1, . . . , Vn denote the vulnerabilities of the system, and let
Li, Ii ∈ R, with 0 ≤ Li, Ii ≤ 1, denote the Likelihood of Vi being manifested and
its Impact, respectively. Let Vi ∈ {0, 1} indicate the exploitation of vulnerability
Vi by a threat Vi = 1, or not Vi = 0.
The Inherent Risk, RI , introduced by a threat is defined by:
RI =
n∑
i=1
(Li × Ii × Vi). (1)
Definition 2. Let mi ∈ N be the number of security mechanisms mitigating
vulnerability Vi, and let Mji ∈ R, with 0 ≤ Mji ≤ 1, denote the Vulnerabil-
ity Mitigation of the j-th security mechanism towards a vulnerability Vi. The
Mitigated Risk of a threat, RM , is defined by:
RM =
n∑
i=1
Li × Ii × Vi × mi∑
j=1
Mji
mi
 . (2)
The residual risk of each threat is the remainder of its inherent risk when the
mitigated risk is subtracted.
Definition 3. The Residual Risk of a threat, RR is defined as:
RR = RI −RM . (3)
It follows that:
Lemma 1.
RR
(3)
= RI −RM (1),(2)=
n∑
i=1
(Li × Ii × Vi)×
1− mi∑
j=1
Mji
mi
 . (4)
The process for deciding which mechanisms should be implemented has four
steps:
Step 1: Security Analysis. The system designers, together with the security
engineers, produce Secure Tropos diagrams, as described in Section 2. These
models reveal all of the threats to the system’s goals and assets under con-
sideration and propose possible alternative solutions, in the form of security
mechanisms, to mitigate the threats.
Step 2: Likelihood Estimation. For each vulnerability, a likelihood value
is estimated using AHP for each threat. When analysing a vulnerability, the
security engineers should assign a likelihood value for each threat that affects
this vulnerability.
Step 3: Impact Estimation. For each vulnerability, an impact value is es-
timated using AHP. To elicit such values, security engineers should perform
pairwise comparisons for all of the vulnerabilities and prioritise them based on
how much the system will be affected if the considered vulnerability is exploited
by a threat.
Step 4. Risk Minimisation. Minimise the Residual Risk by using the optimi-
sation functionality of the extended Secure Tropos. This functionality proposes
a set of security mechanisms that minimise the Residual Risk taking also into
account other goals, such as Cost and Performance.
Now, new types of attacks are continuously being developed and new vulnera-
bilities are discovered as software systems evolve. This means that more variables
may need to be introduced into our optimisation problem and the previously es-
timated values for likelihood and vulnerability might need to be updated. There-
fore, in this setting the risk management process should be taken to iterative in
order to keep the system up-to-date in terms of security decisions throughout its
lifecycle. So, in the case of evolving systems the need for re-evaluation could be
considered as a limitation since it adds additional overheads. Nevertheless, the
intended scope of the approach proposed in this work was to guide the security
choices during the design time of a system to-be. Therefore, while this approach
could additionally be applicable to existing/evolving systems throughout their
lifecycle, the focus here was restricted to the early design stages of information
systems.
4 Case Study
To provide a form of conceptual evaluation of the proposed approach a case study
has been developed, focussing on an information system for the registration of
citizens to a public swimming pool facility at the Municipality of Athens, Greece.
The Secure Tropos framework, the notation of which is presented in Fig. 2, was
used to create all relevant system models. A goal model of the system is presented
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 2. An overview of the Secure Tropos notation
4.1 System Description
The main participants of the system, declared to be actors at the goal model
level, can interact with each other, in the model, via dependency relationships,
to achieve their goals. More specifically, the actors considered in this system are:
(i) the Citizen, aiming to register to be able to use the swimming pool facilities,
(ii) the medical Clinic that examines the citizen and issues a medical certificate,
(iii) the Municipality of Athens Citizen Services (MACS) system that citizens
can use to request and store certificates, (iv) the Swimming Pool Information
System that gathers copies of the necessary certificates, registers citizens and
tracks their usage of the facilities, and (v) the Swimming Pool Administrator
that verifies the validity of the citizen’s certificates and approves their registra-
tion to the facilities. With the collaboration of the system’s designers, the goals
Fig. 3. An extended Secure Tropos goal model of the Swimming Pool Administration
information system
of the participating system actors were further decomposed as sub-goals and
plans, and the documents and infrastructure created and/or utilised throughout
the process were captured as resources. Additionally, non-functional goals (soft-
goals) that the overall system should satisfy were defined by its stakeholders.
More specifically, the first non-functional goal was to keep the implementation
costs at a minimum and the second was to maintain a low system complexity in
order not to introduce significant overheads in terms of system performance.
4.2 Application
Following Step 1 of the recommended risk management process, presented in
Section 3.2, the security requirements of the system were elicited in the form
of security constraints and potential threats, along with the vulnerabilities they
exploit. Such security constraints formed the basis upon which the security anal-
ysis of the system was performed. The security constraints, restricting certain
goals or resources of the system, were identified by the system stakeholders and
connected to the relevant model elements during the security analysis process.
For instance, “Certificate contents shall not be modified after issuing”, was a con-
straint identified for the EMACS system and this is connected to the resources
representing the medical and birth certificates at the goal model level. Each of
the identified security constraints were also assigned to the type of security ob-
jective (e.g., authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, integrity, availability)
that they accomplish.
Through the use of relevant resources (e.g. CAPEC (MITRE, 2017)), a num-
ber of threats were identified and connected to elements of the system that they
can potentially impact. For instance, the threat of “Account Hijacking” was
identified for the Swimming Pool Information System; this threat can poten-
tially impact the accomplishment of the “Create citizen account” plan and the
“Citizen certificates certified copies” resource. A further breakdown of the threat
manifestation and countermeasures for each of the identified threats is provided
by the Security Attacks modelling view, as explained below. Finally, a variety of
security mechanisms were proposed in order to both satisfy the system’s secu-
rity objectives and mitigate the identified threats. The mechanisms were grouped
according to their functionality, so “Encryption”, for instance, could be imple-
mented by any of the identified security mechanisms connected to it (i.e., SSH,
SSL, TLS).
The Security Attacks view, supported by the extended Secure Tropos ap-
proach, provides an in-depth view of each of the identified threats and their
interaction with the rest of the system. For each threat a number of attack
methods are identified, each of which targets one or more vulnerabilities of the
system. Such vulnerabilities can be identified both by analysing the system’s
architecture and via specialised vulnerability repositories (e.g. CVE database).
The same sources can also be used for identifying security mechanisms which can
protect the system against such vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities exploited by
each of the identified threats, and the types of security mechanisms protecting
against each of those vulnerabilities, are visualised within the Security Attacks
view diagrams of Fig. 4 and Fig. 5; this critical information is summarised in
Tab. 1.
(a) T1: Certificate Data Tampering
(b) T2: Certificate Information Disclosure
Fig. 4. Security Attacks views of threats T1 and T2
(a) T3: Account Hijacking
(b) T4: Certificate Copies Information Leak
Fig. 5. Security Attacks views of threats T3 and T4
Next, following Steps 2 and 3 of the proposed approach, impact and likelihood
values were assigned to the identified vulnerabilities using AHP. These values
can be seen in Tab. 2, which also displays the values for the Inherent Risk
Table 1. Matching of Threats, Vulnerabilities and Security Mechanisms
Threat Vuln. Encryption Access Control Hashing Id Mgmt (EMACS) Id Mgmt (SP)
T1 V1 3 3 3
T1, T2 V2 3 3
T2 V3 3
T3 V4 3
T4 V5 3 3
Threats: T1: Certificate Data Tampering,
T2: Certificate Information Disclosure,
T3: Account Hijacking,
T4: Certificate Copies Information Leak
Vulnerabilities: V1: Insecure Data Handling,
V2: Insecure Communication Protocol,
V3: Compromised Web Application,
V4: Weak Credential Management,
V5: Insecure Communication Channel
(computed as per the instructions in Section 3.2). Then, in order to satisfy the
goal model, all of the security constraints, for each agent, must be satisfied.
Given that a security constraint is satisfied when at least one of the proposed
security mechanisms is proposed and that a security mechanism might satisfy
multiple constraints, the final step of our process selects a set of mechanisms to
be implemented that satisfies all the security constraints while minimising risk,
as defined in Section 3.2.
Table 2. Assignation of Impact and Likelihood values
Threat Vulnerability Impact Likelihood Inherent Risk
T1
V1 0.15 0.4
0.15
V2 0.15 0.6
T2
V2 0.15 0.25
0.2625
V3 0.3 0.75
T3 V4 0.25 1 0.25
T4 V5 0.15 1 0.15
A collection of scenarios have been developed and applied to the swimming
pool administration system to help to illustrate an application of our approach
in practice. Each scenario captures a combination of stakeholders’ needs (in the
form of priorities) regarding the functional and non-functional properties of the
system to-be. For instance, a scenario may consider the minimisation of the
overall cost or the reduction of a specific threat as its top optimisation priority.
Such needs are expressed through defined optimisation variables, their thresholds
and their prioritisation, when constructing each scenario.
For the identification of the optimal security implementation for each sce-
nario, as dictated by Step 4 of the proposed approach (in Section 3.2), the
system is modelled as a constraint goal model and is then used as input to the
OptiMathSAT solver. The variables used to define each scenario are the follow-
ing:
1. the residual risk of each threat (as defined in Section 3.2),
2. the added cost and
3. the added performance overhead of the implementation.
In each scenario these variables can either have a specific hard threshold or
they can be set to be minimised (min). Additionally, the minimisation of each
variable can be prioritised against the rest of the variables within each scenario.
The thresholds and priorities of each variable (where the residual risk of task Tk
is denoted RR(Tk)), for each scenario considered, are presented in Tab. 3.
Table 3. Variable thresholds (shown as percentages) and any prioritisation (the su-
perscripts) for each scenario (in each column)
Variable
Scenario
1 2 3 4 5 6
T1 Res. Risk, RR(T1) min min
[1] min[2] min[2] < 25% < 50%
T2 Res. Risk, RR(T2) min min
[2] min[3] min[3] < 25% < 50%
T3 Res. Risk, RR(T3) min min
[3] min[4] min[4] min < 75%
T4 Res. Risk, RR(T4) min min
[4] min[5] min[5] min < 50%
Added Cost Coverage min min[5] min[1] min[6] min[1] min[1]
Performance Overhead
Coverage
min min[6] min[6] min[1] min[2] min[2]
To obtain values for these variables for each scenario, each of the proposed
security mechanisms is instantiated with numerical values regarding the per-
centage of mitigation it offers for each of the system’s vulnerabilities and its
contribution towards added system cost and performance. An overview of the
values assigned to the mechanisms of the swimming pool administration system
is provided in Tab. 4; here, to aid understanding, we use the simplified notation
MV k to denote the mitigation value of the mechanism in the row for vulnerabil-
ity V k, in place of the notation Mjk from Section 3.2, where the j would refer
to the mechanism in the row, and the k to the vulnerability V k. The resulting
security configurations, presented in Tab. 5, is a combination of the proposed
mechanisms which optimally satisfies the parameters of each scenario (which
were summarised in Tab. 3).
Table 4. Values assigned for the vulnerability mitigation (MV k), cost and performance
effects of the security mechanisms
Mechanism Group Security
Mechanism
MV 1 MV 2 MV 3 MV 4 MV 5 Cost Perf.
Encryption
SSH 0 0.6 0 0 0.6 30 30
SSL 0 0.3 0 0 0.3 20 20
TLS 0 0.8 0 0 0.8 40 20
Access
Firewall 0.3 0.6 0.4 0 0 50 60
AntiVirus 0.5 0.3 0.3 0 0 40 70
Control Firewall &
Antivirus
0.7 0.8 0.7 0 0 90 80
Hashing
MD5 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 10 20
SHA2 0.6 0 0 0 0.6 30 20
BLAKE2 0.8 0 0 0 0.8 40 20
Ident. Management Password 0.3 0 0 0 0 50 50
EMACS Multi-Factor 0.7 0 0 0 0 60 80
Ident. Management Password 0 0 0 0.3 0 50 50
SP IS Smart Card 0 0 0.6 0 0 60 30
Scenario 1: The first scenario represents a simple optimisation of all of the
system’s variables. Therefore, all the variables are set to be minimised, without
any assigned priorities between them, as indicated by the values in the second
column of Tab. 3 (i.e. the one indicating Scenario 1). The parameters of this
scenario represent a case where the system’s stakeholders require a system con-
figuration which minimises the cost and added overhead, whilst at the same time
keeps the residual risk of all of the potential threats at a minimum level. Such
parameters lead to an implementation including, as shown in the second column
of Tab. 5, SSL as the selected encryption technology, a firewall as an access
control mechanism, MD5 as a hashing algorithm and Password Authentication
Protocol as the authentication mechanism of choice for both the EMACS and
the Swimming Pool Information System.
Scenario 2: The second scenario presents a variation of the first scenario, em-
phasising the minimisation of risk from the identified threats. Thus, explicit
priorities are set for the optimisation variables, as indicated by their superscript
values, shown in the Scenario 2 column of Tab. 3. All variables are still set to
be minimised but in this case the optimisation process prioritises the minimisa-
tion of the residual risks of the four identified threats in a descending priority,
starting with T1 (priorities [1] to [4] in the third column of Tab. 3). The minimi-
sation of the non-functional goals (priorities [5] for cost and [6] for performance)
follows in the prioritisation of the optimisation variables. The solution identified
in this case, as shown in the second column of Tab. 5, includes, TLS for en-
cryption, both Firewall and Antivirus as access control mechanisms, BLAKE2
for hashing, multi-factor authentication for the EMACS system and Smart Card
authentication for the Swimming Pool Information System.
Table 5. Resulting recommendation of system configurations for each given scenario
Mech.
Scenario
1 2 3 4 5 6
Encryption SSL TLS SSL TLS TLS TLS
Access Con-
trol
Firewall Firewall &
AntiVirus
AntiVirus Firewall Firewall &
AntiVirus
Firewall
Hashing MD5 BLAKE2 MD5 BLAKE2 BLAKE2 MD5
Ident. Mgmt
EMACS
Password Multi-
Factor
Authent.
Password Password Multi-
Factor
Authent.
Password
Ident. Mgmt
SP IS
Password SmartCard Password SmartCard Password SmartCard
Scenario 3: The third scenario represents an optimisation process aiming to
minimise the cost of the system configuration. As such, all variables are set to
be minimised with the cost variable being given the top optimisation priority.
The minimisation of the residual risks of all four threats are given the next
highest optimisation priority, followed by the added performance overhead, as
indicated by the priority values of the fourth column of Tab. 3. The implemen-
tation suggested as a result includes security mechanisms with the lowest cost
value (i.e., SSL, Antivirus, MD5 and Password Authentication Protocol for both
the EMACS and the Swimming Pool Information System).
Scenario 4: The fourth scenario is similar to the third but, the minimisation
of the added performance overhead is the main concern of the stakeholders.
Therefore, the performance variable has the top optimisation priority, with the
residual risks following and the cost being the bottom priority. The identified
solution, as shown in the fifth column of Tab. 4, includes security mechanisms
adding the least to the performance overhead of the system (i.e., TLS, Firewall,
BLAKE2, Password Authentication Protocol and Smart Cards).
Scenario 5: The fifth scenario represents an optimisation process aiming to min-
imize the cost and performance overheads while also keeping the risk introduced
by specific threats below certain levels. Therefore, explicit thresholds have been
set for the residual risks of threats 1 and 2 in order to limit them to a maximum
of 25% of their initial inherent risk, whilst the added cost and performance over-
head have been assigned as the top two priorities for the optimisation process.
As a result of the optimisation process, the implementation proposed contains
TLS, both Firewall and Antivirus, BLAKE2, multi-factor authentication for the
EMACS system and Password Authentication Protocol for the Swimming Pool
Information System.
Scenario 6: The final scenario is similar to the fifth but, in this case, maximum
accepted risk thresholds have been defined for all of the identified threats. The
top optimisation priorities have been assigned to the non-functional aspects of
the system (i.e., cost and performance). The maximum accepted values of resid-
ual risk for each threat, as indicated in the last column of Tab. 3, is expressed
as a percentage of the initial inherent risk of each threat. The produced solu-
tion suggests the combination of TLS, firewall, MD5, Password Authentication
Protocol and Smart Cards as the mechanisms of choice.
4.3 Discussion
The capability of our proposal to successfully adapt the system-at-hand within
a diverse range of such scenarios, indicates that: (i) the proposed approach is
adequately equipped to capture the contextual information necessary for quan-
titative risk assessment; and (ii) it can be used as the main input for an analysis
process which is able to produce appropriate system configurations. The ability
of the approach to accommodate any number of variables in the analysis pro-
cess, both risk and soft-goal related, adds to its flexibility. For instance, in our
case study, we identified four potential threats and two qualitative soft-goals for
the whole system. However, the application of the approach could easily scale in
the case that more threats, soft-goals and security mechanisms were identified.
The same applies for the number of different security configurations identified
through the presented scenarios. In our case study, we chose six scenarios in each
of which the priorities or the maximum accepted values of the involved variables
were different. We decided to do so in order to demonstrate the ability of the
approach to generate different security configurations under diverse conditions.
Nevertheless, any number of scenarios can be generated during the application
of this approach, in order to reflect the needs and limitations of the system that
is being analysed.
Finally, it is worth indicating that certain aspects of the analysis in this case
study were performed as a proof-of-concept and are not meant to be exhaustive.
Therefore, a more complete security analysis could be supported by this approach
if a more detailed constraint, threat or security mechanism elicitation process
takes place with the participation of the security experts. The same is true for
the value assignment of the variables related to the impact and likelihood of the
identified vulnerabilities and the mitigation, cost and performance overhead of
the identified security mechanisms. Nevertheless, the accuracy and completeness
of the security analysis presented in the example used for this case study does not
adversely affect the capabilities of the proposed approach. In general, reflection
on such generated scenarios in conjunction with stakeholders (or even enabling
their own experimentation with altering the values), may also help them to
deepen their understanding of the implications of the prioritisation and threshold
decisions.
5 Related Work
The work of Cailliau and Van Lamsweerde (2012) introduces a probabilistic
framework for goal-oriented risk analysis which performs quantitative reasoning
using formal semantics in order to identify the effect of risks on the achieve-
ment of system goals. In Chatzikonstantinou et al. (2014), decision task models
(DTMs), an extension of goal model diagrams, are introduced, which are able to
capture temporal dimensions on goal tree structures, upon the nodes of which
cost and benefit values can be attached. Based on such values, and other formally
defined constraints, an optimisation process can identify benefit-maximising sys-
tem compositions. Our approach also makes use of constrained goal models for
the performance of trade-off analysis but, in contrast with the above works, it
has a clear information security orientation, as it is equipped with concepts and
attributes which allows it to measure different aspects of risk and the effects of
countermeasures on them.
Elahi and Yu (2007); Elahi and Eric (2011) introduce a security-oriented ap-
proach for risk-aware trade off analysis, based on an extension of the i* goal
modelling framework. The notation introduced and the tool-supported analy-
sis provided, however, are qualitative and therefore less fine-grained than the
one proposed by our approach. A more implementation-oriented approach is
presented by Yuan et al. (2013), where architectural patterns are used for per-
forming adaptations to the system according to the results of the evaluation of
its security properties during runtime. It does not, however, elaborate on trade-
offs between security and other system requirements because it is not meant
to be utilised as a design-time approach since it requires a complete system
architecture for its application.
The work of Pasquale et al. (2015) introduces a requirements-driven approach
for automated and quantitative security trade-off analysis through a sophisti-
cated optimisation algorithm. Similarly, Aydemir et al. (2016) propose a multi-
objective, goal-oriented, risk modelling and analysis framework, which is based
on constrained goal models and uses OptiMathSAT to identify optimal security
countermeasures. As opposed to our approach, the capabilities of these works to
capture social aspects of the system are limited. To overcome these limitations,
our approaches uses Secure Tropos as the basis of our analysis, after extending it
with concepts and attributes that enable the capturing of risk-related aspects. In
general, extensions of the Secure Tropos approach can be identified throughout
the literature of the area. Such attempts either extend or built on the analysis
performed by Secure Tropos in order to support security requirements elicitation
in a variety of different contexts. For instance, the work of Argyropoulos, Shei,
Kalloniatis, Mouratidis, Delaney, Fish and Gritzalis (2017) utilises Secure Tro-
pos in conjunction with business process modelling for the elicitation of secure
service compositions for cloud computing environments. Nevertheless, the focus
of the current work is shifted towards the incorporation of risk related aspects
of analysis into the existing Secure Tropos framework. A similar attempt to-
wards the alignment of Secure Tropos with the information system security risk
management (ISSRM) reference model is presented by Matulevicˇius et al. (2008)
where its risk-related conceptual limitations are identified, the most important
of which being the lack of support for expressing and quantitatively evaluating
the concept of risk. The overcoming of such limitations is one of the motivating
factors for the development of the approach presented in this work.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we introduced an approach built around an extension of Secure
Tropos with risk and CGM related concepts. Furthermore, we demonstrated
its capabilities of supporting quantitative risk assessment and trade-off analysis
between security and other requirements. This was achieved by defining linear
cost-functions to estimate the risk of each threat manifestation in our system
and optimising various qualitative attributes, such as cost and performance.
More specifically, we propose a framework which can use AHP to estimate the
likelihood of threats to manifest and the impact of their manifestation on the
system under consideration. The prioritisation of the defined cost-functions pro-
vided by stakeholders is permitted, and, with the use of an SMT/OMT reasoner,
they can be optimising in priority order, and a set of security mechanisms to be
used as security countermeasures can be selected accordingly.
This work has established the groundwork for several future directions of
research. These include the exploration of the use of alternative reasoners (e.g.,
Z3 (De Moura and Bjørner, 2008)) which, in contrast with the OptiMathSAT,
also support more complex, non-linear cost-functions. Another direction is to
try to reduce the framework’s current reliance on experts in order to assess the
levels of risks and propose security countermeasures, thereby easing the stake-
holder’s overhead and encouraging adoption. However, some of this reliance is an
inherent shortcoming of all risk management approaches, because the definition
of quantitative values for risk calculations by experts always introduces a degree
of subjectivity. One avenue to pursue to reduce the reliance of the approach on
expert input is to explore additional automation techniques for various compo-
nents. Templates of risk calculation, using impact and likelihood values extracted
from online resources and historical data of similar systems, could be provided to
users. Such values could then be modified and refined according to the specifics
of the system at hand. Thus, users of the approach will not necessarily need to
perform the estimation of all values from scratch, since they will be provided
with initial suggestions that that can choose to modify. Finally, an interactive
scenario-based approach could be used in conjunction with stakeholders to help
them to deepen their understanding of the implications of the prioritisation and
threshold decisions, and even to potentially revise threshold values or priorities
accordingly.
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